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Abstract
This study explores the effects of Calorie labeling laws implemented in some counties
in the United States on several health related variables. The findings show a small
significant decreasing effect of the law on Limited activity and Poor health of 0.083
and 0.047 at 95% significant level respectively.
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1 Introduction
The state of obesity in the United States, September 2015, reports that adult obesity exceeds
35 percent in Arkansas, West Virginia and Mississippi; 22 states have rates above 30 percent,
45 states are above 25 percent and every state is above 20 percent (Levi et al, 2015).
Obesity is related to medical conditions such as stroke; vascular disease, several types
of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes, which imposes externalities such as lower
probability of employment, lower wages, and higher medical care costs (Sturm, 2002). Cawley
and Meyerhoefer, 2012, finds that estimates of the obesity impact are underestimated, which
negatively impacts the government intervention to reduce obesity externalities.
Economic research on obesity is extensive and covers topics such as economic causes,
measurements, medical consequences and costs among others. Overall, the evidence sug-
gests that there is no single economic cause of obesity, but instead there are a variety of
contributors to the problem and the current interventions have only modest effects thus a
range of policies may be required to achieve a substantial positive effect on the prevalence
of obesity (Cawley, 2015).
Deb and Vargas, 2016 studied the effect of calorie labeling laws on BMI in the United
States using a Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) dataset comprised by the
2003 to 2012 survey waves. States that implemented the law were identified as treated and
neighboring states and counties were used as controls in the study. The analysis was carried
out at a county level using a difference in difference regression model. Deb and Vargas found
statistically significant decreasing estimated effects of the law on BMI on overweight women
as well as significant decreasing estimated effects on normal, overweight and obese males,
with the largest effects on overweight and obese males. The importance of the study lies
in that by acknowledging the heterogeneity of effects Deb and Vargas were able to identify
effects that several studies have failed to identify and opened new possibilities at a policy
level calling for stratified interventions that will fulfill subpopulation needs for information
on food caloric and nutritional contents. In this study, I am examining the effects of the
calorie labeling law on Health status, Exercise, Limited activity, Days of illness and Poor
health trying to understand the mechanisms through which the law has an effect on the
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overweight and obese population (Deb and Vargas, 2016) and also to understand whether
there are broader impacts of the law on health.
2 Previous literature
Several studies have been made on the effect of calorie labeling laws on menus and menu
boards. Bassett et al, 2008 studied the purchasing behavior and calorie information at 11
fast-food chains in New York and found that consumers purchase lower amount of calories
in the presence of caloric information.
Harnack et al, 2008 conducted a randomized experiment were participants ordered a
food meal from one of four menus that vary in regards to whether calorie information was
provided and value price sizing was used. The study included adolescents and adults habitual
fast food patrons. Researchers recorded foods ordered and consumption of participants. No
significant differences in energy consumption were found among meals ordered or eaten.
Chu et al, 2009 examined changes in meal selection by patrons in presence of nutrition
labels and concluded that the presence of labels reduced the average energy content of
purchases without reducing the overall sales.
Kuo et al, 2009 in Los Angeles, California conducted a sensitivity analysis to account for
uncertainty in consumer response and in total annual revenue, market share, and average
meal price of large chain restaurants. Researchers estimated that 10% of consumers would
lower caloric consumption due to the law postings, and as a result, they estimated an average
annual reduction of 40.6% of the 6.75 million pound average gain in the county population
aged 5 or more. Their findings suggest that the mandate could have a large impact on the
state of obesity.
Elbel et al, 2009 examined the effect of the law in New York City. The study collected
receipts and surveyed consumers before and after the law was implemented at food chains
located in low-income areas. Calories purchased were matched to the nutritional value of
items purchased. A difference in difference model indicated that the NYC menu labeling
law had no effect on consumers. Newark fast food restaurants were used as controls. Elbel
et al, 2011 studied the effect of the law on purchases on children and adolescents in New
York City‘s fast food restaurants located at low income areas and found that they observed
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calorie information at similar rates as adults, but they were less responsive to the information.
Vadiveloo et al, 2011 used the same dataset and a difference in difference design to survey
adults in chain restaurants before and after the implementation of the law and found no
difference in purchasing as a result of labeling.
Roberto et al, 2010 studied the effect of the law on food choices and intake. The re-
searchers randomly assigned three different menus to study subjects. First menu had no
calorie information; second menu informed calorie contents; and third menu informed of
calorie contents and daily caloric requirement. Researchers found that additional informa-
tion is beneficial as individuals consumed 14% less calories when given more information.
Dumanovsky et al, 2010 studied the effect of the law in New York City collecting in-
formation before and after the implementation of the law. Consumers were surveyed at
45 randomly selected fast food restaurants. Researchers found no evidence of lower caloric
purchase. Increase in customer awareness of the law was found.
Bollinger et al, 2011 estimated the impact of the law in New York City using data from
Starbucks purchases in three cities. Researchers used a difference in difference strategy and
found that menu labels reduced average calories per transaction by 6%. The law reduced
average calories from food consumed and had no impact on beverage purchases. Loyal
Starbuck cardholder customers reduced their consumption per transaction by 26%. The
cities of Boston and Philadelphia were used as controls.
Dumanovsky et al, 2011 assessed the impact of calorie labeling on fast food restaurants on
individual purchases based on consumer register receipts and found no decline on purchasing
of calories on the full sample.
Finkelstein et al, 2011 studied the impact of calorie labeling law on transactions and
purchasing behavior at one Mexican fast food chain located within and adjacent to King
county, Washington. They found no impact of the law on healthier food purchasing.
Swartz et al, 2011 reviewed 7 studies on the effect of calorie labeling from 2006 to 2011
and found that all of them compared calorie ordering and purchasing in two conditions:
calorie label versus no calorie label. Only two of the seven studies reported statistically
significant reduction in calories purchased. Two of the seven studies were judged to be of
good quality and five of fair quality. The evidence suggests that calorie labeling does not
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have the intended effect on consumer purchasing.
On food label determinants, Stran and Knol, 2013 used a multiple linear regression design
to analyze a sample of adults from the 2005-2006 National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) and targeted food label use determinants. The findings indicated that
determinants of food label are differential by sex, race, and age.
On searching for most effective ways of presenting menu labels to the general public,
Platkin et al, 2014 studied the effect of menu labeling with calories and exercise equivalents
on food selection and consumption. They found no significant difference between the infor-
mation and control groups and suggested that finding more effective ways of presenting the
menu labels is needed to improve the effects of the law.
A working paper by Restrepo, 2014 examined the effects of calorie labeling in a number
of New York counties between 2008 and 2010. Restrepo used a difference-in-difference design
and data from the 2004 to 2012 waves of BRFSS to examine the effects of calorie labeling
on body mass index (BMI). He found robust evidence of significant decreases in BMI due
to calorie labeling. He estimated quantile regressions to show that there is heterogeneity in
the effects of calorie labeling and the effects are generally larger in the upper quantiles of
the BMI distribution.
Deb and Vargas, 2016 studied the effects of the calorie labeling law in the United States
using a difference in difference design and data from the 2003 to 2012 waves of BRFSS. Deb
and Vargas used finite mixture models to identify the heterogeneity of effects and characterize
the heterogeneity along the dimensions of the outcome distribution. They identified three
latent classes which matched the normal, overweight and obese groups and found significant
estimated effects on the overweight classes of men and women. The effects were males
significant for the three classes and larger for overweight and obese.
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3 Data
The dataset includes the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) waves of
2003-2012. BRFSS is a yearly telephone survey that collects health related data from every
state in the United States (U.S.), including risk behaviors, chronic health conditions and
use of preventive services. BRFSS collects data from adults in all 50 states, the district
of Columbia and three U.S. territories and it is mainly sponsored by most divisions in the
National for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (CDC) and other federal
agencies. The survey contains self-reported information on demographic and health related
information, which is used in the analysis. Preliminary exploration of the data suggested
substantial gender heterogeneity, so the analysis was carried out by gender throughout. The
dataset is restricted to individuals whose BMI is larger than 24.9 (overweight and obese),
and age is within 21 to 75 years old. Because BRFSS has some extremely small and large
weights, individuals with the smallest and largest quarter percent of sampling weights were
also dropped to avoid complications after the entropy balance reweighing.
The BRFSS dataset is merged with Information from the Area Resource File (ARF)
to classify each county by population, income and year. Counties with more than 20,000
individuals are considered urban; small metropolitan areas (population less than 250,000);
metropolitan areas (population between 250,000 and 1,000,000) and large metropolitan areas
with population larger than a million individuals. Median household income in each county
is also included in the dataset. From the County Business Patterns (CBP), data about the
number of employees in limited service restaurants (LSR) is obtained to use as a proxy for
the size of the LSR sector. This data reports the number of employees in limited service
restaurants per 1,000 population in each county.
County-specific information on legislation and implementation of calorie labeling laws was
cross-referenced from the National Conference of State Legislature, the Center for Science in
the Public Interest and MenuCalc, an online nutrition analysis platform for the food industry
endorsed by the National Restaurant Association.
Table 1 shows a chronological list of states and counties that implemented the menu
labeling laws and the states included in the control group of the study. Neighboring counties
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and states were selected for the control group throughout the period of study. Figures 1
and 2 depict the geography of the counties and states included in the study and shades of
blue indicate the year of implementation with lighter shades for 2008 and increasing shades
of blue for later years of implementation. Control states and counties are simply outlined in
black. The figures show a concentration of the laws in the Eastern and Western regions of
the United States.
The key variable of the analysis is an indicator variable labeled “County has law enforced”
that takes a value of “one” if the county has implemented the menu calorie labeling law in
the month and year of the interview and “zero” otherwise. The variable “County has law”
takes the value of “one” if the county ever has the law and “zero” otherwise. In addition,
there are dummy variables for every state, and every year included in the study, as well as
a county indicator variable.
Five dependent (outcome) variables are selected from the dataset and used in the analysis
with the aim of exploring the effect of the menu calorie labeling laws on each one of them.
The analysis is carried out by gender, clustered by individual county and using the balanced
weights. The dependent variables are labeled as follows: 1. Health status corresponds to
the question: Would you say that in general your health is: Excellent, very good, good,
fair, and poor. Each category takes a numerical value from 1 to 5 respectively. 2. A
variable labeled Exercise corresponds to the question: During the past month, other than
your regular job, did you participate in any physical activities or exercises such as running,
calisthenics, golf, gardening, or walking for exercise? The variable takes a value of ”one” if
the participant answers “yes” and “zero” otherwise. 3. A variable labeled Limited activity
corresponds to the question: Are you limited in any way in any activities because of physical,
mental, or emotional problems? The variable takes a value of “one” if the individual gives an
affirmative answer and “zero” otherwise. 4. A variable labeled Days of illness corresponds
to the question: Now thinking about your physical health, which includes physical illness
and injury, for how many days during the past 30 days was your physical health not good?
This variable takes a value from “one” to “thirty”. 5. Lastly, a variable labeled Poor health
corresponds to the question: During the past 30 days, for about how many days did poor
physical or mental health keep you from doing your usual activities such as self-care, work,
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or recreation? This variable takes a value from “one” to “thirty”.
4 Methods
4.1 Entropy balance weights
Entropy balance has been proposed as a preprocessing technique to achieve covariate bal-
ance in observational studies with a binary treatment. Weighting / reweighing the sample
such that the covariate distribution of the control group becomes more similar to the co-
variate distribution in the treatment group to achieve balance between treated and control
observations, (Abadie and Imbens, 2011). In this study, I include the mean value of the
outcome for each pre-treatment year of data by county and gender in the set of covariates
used in the entropy balancing algorithm. Thus, following the principles of synthetic control
groups proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003 and Abadie et al, 2010, not only are the
treated and control samples balanced on covariates, they are also balanced on the values of
the county-level average outcome in each year of the pre-treatment period.
I use a method for generating weights to create balance: Entropy balancing. The method,
developed by Hainmueller, 2011, produces a set of observation-level weights that directly
balances covariate distributions across treated and control groups. Inverse propensity score
weighting is the popular method for this purpose (Ho et al, 2007) but the entropy balance
method has a number of practical advantages. First, it eliminates the need to back and forth
between propensity score specification, estimation and balance checking. Second, propensity
score weights can lead to worse balance on some covariate dimensions while improving bal-
ance on others (Iacus et al, 2011). Third, while the weights are adjusted as far as is needed
to accommodate the balance constraints, at the same time they are kept as close as possible
to the base weights to retain information in the reweighed data, so extreme weights are much
less likely.
In the propensity score weighting method, every treated unit gets a weight di = 1 and
every control unit gets a weight equal to di =
p̂(xi)
1−p̂(xi) where p̂(xi) is the estimated propensity
score. In the entropy balancing method, each treated unit gets either a weight wi = 1
or wi = si, where si is the sampling weight associated with the treated observations, and
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every control unit gets a weight that satisfies a set of a priori specified balance constraints.









wicri(xi) = kr with r ∈ 1, ..., R∑
i|D=0
wi = 1
wi ≥ 0 for all i such that D = 0
where cri(Xi) = mr describes a set of R balance constraints imposed on the covariate
moments of the reweighed control group. Each balance constraint equates the weighted
mean of the covariate in the treated sample to the weighted mean of the covariate in the
control sample. In the case of indicator variables, which comprise most of the covariates in
the study, equality of means is equivalent to equality of distributions. I conduct entropy
balance for each gender and year of data separately, so covariate balance is obtained within
each gender-year subsample.
I apply the entropy balance algorithm iteratively. In the first application of the algorithm,
I set the weights for the treated group to their sampling weights and have one balance
constraint for each covariate used in the regression analysis. The second application of the
entropy balance algorithm adds county-mean of Health Status (in addition to the regression
covariates) into the set of balance constraints. This generates a new set of balance-weights,
which I use to recalculate county-level mean Health Status for the pre-treatment years. The
third application of the entropy balance algorithm uses, once again, balances constraints for
covariates and county-level mean. The balance algorithm is applied again adding county-
means of Exercise, Limited activity, Days of illness, Poor health consecutively. The revised
balance weights have a correlation of 0.99 with the weights from the prior iteration, so I
consider the process to have converged to a stable set of balance weights.
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4.2 Logistic regression
The case when the outcome is a discrete variable or a binary variable that has a value of 1
if the event is true and zero otherwise, such as whether a person was cured after receiving
a treatment, or whether the person is employed or unemployed, and some independent
variables that may or may not be continuous. The outcome could also be an ordered outcome
which has more than two categories and they are assumed to have a logical order. For
instance, a customer satisfaction survey may ask how satisfied you are with your purchase.
The options for answering the question might be ”great satisfaction”, ”average satisfaction”,
”poor satisfaction”. This options may be represented by an integer that conveys the ordered
value of the answers. Finally, the outcome could be a count variable that counts the number
of times something has happened, such as the number of times in a month the patient
went to the emergency room. In all these cases, I am going to use a model that fits the
individual characteristics to the dependent variable of interest (Long et al, 2014). The linear
regression model does not fit this set of data, and therefore I need to find a different solution.
I have a binary dependent variable Y , and I want to model the conditional probability
Pr(Y = 1|X = x) as a function of x; and any unknown parameters in the function are to
be estimated by maximum likelihood. In a binary response model, interest lies primarily in
the response probability
P (y = 1|x) = P (y = 1|x1, x2, ..., xi), (2)
where x denotes the full set of explanatory variables, for example in this study one of the
dependent variables is exercise and some of the independent variables are education, race,
income, and marital status.
Consider a class of binary response models of the form
P (y = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βkxk) = G(β0 + xβ), (3)
where G is a function taking values strictly between zero and one: 0 < G(z) < 1, for all real
numbers z. This assures that the estimated response probabilities are strictly between zero
and one.
xβ = β1x1 + ...+ βkxk (4)
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In the logit model, G is the logistic function:
G(z) = exp (z)/[1 + exp (z)] = A(z), (5)
which is between zero and one for all real numbers z. This is the cumulative distribution
function for a standard logistic random variable.
The logit model can be derived from an underlying latent variable model. Let y∗ be an
unobserved, or latent variable determined by
y∗ = β0 + xβ + e, y = 1[y∗ > 0], (6)
where the notation 1[.] defines a binary outcome. The function 1[.] is called the indicator
function, which takes the value of one if the event in brackets is true, and zero otherwise.
Therefore, y is one if y∗ > 0, and y is zero if y∗ ≤ 0. I assume that e is independent from x
and that e has the standard logistic distribution. In addition, e is symmetrically distributed
about zero, which means that 1−G(−z) = G(z) for all real numbers z.
Assume that I have a random sample of size n. To obtain the maximum likelihood
estimator, conditional on the explanatory variables, I need the density of yi, given xi.
f(y|xi; β) = [G(xiβ)y[1−G(xiβ)]1−y, y = 0, 1, (7)
The log-likelihood for an observation i is a function of the parameters and the data (xi, yi)
and is obtained by taking :
li(β) = yi log[G(xiβ)] + (1− yi)log[1−G(xiβ)]. (8)






The MLE of β denoted by β̂ maximizes this log-likelihood. If G[.] is the standard logit cdf,
then β̂ is the logit estimator.
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The general theory of MLE for random samples implies that, under general conditions the
MLE is consistent, asymptotically normal, and asymptotically efficient. Each β̂j comes with
an (asymptotic) standard error, which are reported along with the estimated coefficients by
any statistical package(Wooldridge, 2009), (Archer and Lemeshow, 2006).
4.3 Poisson regression model
Another kind of nonnegative dependent variable is a count variable, which can take on
integer non-negative values. I am interested in the case where y takes on relatively few
values including zero. In my study, I consider a variable that takes values from one to thirty
responding to the question how many days of illness the participant had in a month. A
linear model can not provide the best fit for this type of explanatory variables because the
distribution of this data can be very different from normal. Instead, the nominal distribution
for count data is Poisson distribution.
Because I am interested in the effect of explanatory variables on y, then I look at the
Poisson distribution conditional on x. This distribution is entirely determined by the mean,
so I only need to specify E(y|x). I assume that this has the form
E(y|(x1, x2, ...+ xk) = exp (β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βkxk) (10)
which is also exp(xβ). So, the probability that y equals the value h, conditional on x, is
P (y = h|x) = exp[− exp(xβ)][exp(xβ)]h/h!, h = 0, 1, ... (11)
where h! denotes factorial. This distribution allows us to find conditional probabilities for
any values of the explanatory variables. Once I have estimates of of the βj, I can plug them
into the probabilities for various values of x.








[yixiβ − exp (xiβ)], (12)
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Then, I maximize the likelihood function and obtain the β̂j estimates and the standard
errors. These are reported by any statistical package.
Poisson is a natural step for a count data but it is often too restrictive because all the
probabilities and higher moments are determined entirely by the mean. In particular, the
variance is equal to the mean:
V ar(y|x) = E(y|x) (13)
Fortunately, the Poisson distribution has a very nice robustness property: whether or not
the Poisson distribution holds, I still get consistent, asymptotically normal estimators of the
βj. (Wooldridge, 2009). This is analogous to the OLS estimator, which is consistent and
asymptotically normal whether or not the normality assumption holds; yet OLS is the MLE
under normality.
5 Results
Summary statistics are displayed in tables 2 and 3 and are stratified by gender and law
status. Means are calculated using survey weights, and balanced weights obtained after
using the entropy balancing algorithm by year, by gender, and by each one of the dependent
variables. The total sample has 627,346 individuals and is composed by 332,857 females
and 294,489 males. Females in counties with the law are 111,383 and the remaining 221,857
are located in counties without the law. There are 97,283 males in counties with the law
and 197,206 in counties without the law. The sample summary statistics, calculated using
survey weights, show that individuals in counties with the law are more likely to be of other
minority, Hispanic race, unmarried, less than high school educated, and low income. After
using the entropy balance weights then the covariate distribution is adjusted to minimize
the difference between the treated and untreated covariate groups, allowing me to interpret
the regression estimates as being “doubly robust”.
Tables 4 and 5 depict the dependent variables that are used in the regressions. The
means are stratified by gender and law status. Means are calculated using survey weights
and entropy balanced weights respectively.
I carried out an ordered logit regression on variable Health Status stratified by gender and
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clustered by county. The output shows no significant effect of the menu calorie labeling law.
Likewise, a logit regression on variable Exercise by gender and clustered by county shows no
significant effect of the calorie labeling law. Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients.
A logit regression on variable Limited Activity stratified by gender and clustered by
county shows a significant decreasing effect of the law in the amount of 0.083 at 95% signifi-
cance level on women. Other coefficients are significant and have the expected sign, such as
age, black race, Hispanic ethnicity, married, some college, and income. There is no effect of
the law on men. See the estimated coefficients on table 7.
A Poisson regression on Poor Health depicts a significant small decreasing effect of the
law in the amount of 0.047 at 95% significant level on women. No effect of the law is found
on men. Other coefficients such as age, other minority, education and income are significant
and show the expected signs. See the estimated coefficients on table 7.
Lastly, a Poisson regression stratified by gender and clustered by county on Days of Illness
also finds no signifficant effect of the law for neither men nor women.
6 Conclusion
Physical activity and inactivity rates vary across states and regions of the US, as reported
by the CDC 1. Americans in the Southern states are less likely to be physically active as
compared to Americans in the West, Northeast and Midwest regions of the country. Some
groups are also more physically active than others. For example, Men (54%) are more likely
than women (46%) to meet the 2008 Physical Activity Guideline for aerobic activity.
Research evidence also indicates that adults with more education are more likely to meet
the required levels of physical activity recommended for healthy living, as well as, adults
whose income is above the poverty level are more likely to meet healthier levels of physical
activity and consequently, improve their health self-perception.
In this study, I wanted to examine the effects of the calorie labeling law on self-reported
Health status, Exercise, Limited Activity, Days of Illness, and Poor Health in order to
understand the mechanisms through which the law has an effect on the overweight and
obese males and females. I find a very small significant decreasing effect of the law on
1http://www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/data/facts.htm
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the self-reported Limited physical activity and Poor health variables, which capture a small
improvement in the individuals well being that could be attributed to the menu calorie
labeling law. The non continuous variables used in the study are not appropriate to quantify
the causal effect of the calorie labeling law, and the expectation for the near future is to
have the law implemented in a larger number of counties and states as mandated by the
Affordable Care Act; and along with it, have surveys introduce variables tailored to capture
people’s eating habits changes and persistent health improvements.
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Table 1: Sample geography by calorie-labeling law status and dates
Date State County
8/2008 New York Queens
8/2008 New York Kings
8/2008 New York Richmond
8/2008 New York Bronx
8/2008 New York New York City
6/2009 New York Westchester




4/2010 New York Albany
10/2010 New York Schenectady





The following states with no calorie-labeling laws
through 2012 are included in the control group:
Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, Maryland,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Arizona, Idaho, Nevada.
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Table 2: Covariate means using sampling weights
Women Men
No law Law No law Law
County has law enforced 0.109 0.385 0.107 0.386
Age / 10 4.795 4.678 4.681 4.611
Age (/10) squared 2.206 2.261 2.161 2.159
Black race 0.049 0.052 0.034 0.031
Other minority 0.022 0.031 0.026 0.036
Hispanic ethnicity 0.042 0.130 0.039 0.097
Married 0.594 0.544 0.683 0.645
Less than High School 0.089 0.175 0.076 0.137
High school graduate 0.305 0.244 0.285 0.229
Some college 0.300 0.284 0.260 0.255
Income < $15,000 0.082 0.166 0.048 0.094
Income $15,000 - $25,000 0.143 0.154 0.101 0.121
Income $25,000 - $35,000 0.103 0.102 0.085 0.088
Income $35,000 - $50,000 0.143 0.124 0.135 0.121
Income $50,000 - $75,000 0.163 0.142 0.175 0.150
Income unknown 0.110 0.075 0.085 0.058
Pregnant 0.018 0.019
Metro county pop. 250K-1M 0.237 0.184 0.240 0.186
Metro county pop. < 250K 0.090 0.046 0.087 0.049
Urban county pop. > 20K 0.072 0.022 0.069 0.023
County median HH income ($10K) 5.636 5.506 5.705 5.658
County LSR employees per 1000 pop. 9.310 9.630 9.272 9.684
N 221,474 111,383 197,206 97,283
Means calculated using sampling weights
Year and state coefficients are not displayed in the table
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Table 3: Covariate balanced means using balanced weights
Women Men
No law Law No law Law
County has law enforced 0.100 0.385 0.100 0.386
Age / 10 4.678 4.678 4.611 4.611
Age (/10) squared 2.261 2.261 2.159 2.159
Black race 0.052 0.052 0.031 0.031
Other minority 0.031 0.031 0.036 0.036
Hispanic ethnicity 0.130 0.130 0.097 0.097
Married 0.544 0.544 0.645 0.645
Less than High School 0.175 0.175 0.137 0.137
High school graduate 0.244 0.244 0.229 0.229
Some college 0.284 0.284 0.255 0.255
Income < $15,000 0.166 0.166 0.094 0.094
Income $15,000 - $25,000 0.154 0.154 0.121 0.121
Income $25,000 - $35,000 0.102 0.102 0.088 0.088
Income $35,000 - $50,000 0.124 0.124 0.121 0.121
Income $50,000 - $75,000 0.142 0.142 0.150 0.150
Income unknown 0.075 0.075 0.058 0.058
Pregnant 0.019 0.019
Metro county pop. 250K-1M 0.184 0.184 0.186 0.186
Metro county pop. < 250K 0.046 0.046 0.049 0.049
Urban county pop. > 20K 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023
County median HH income ($10K) 5.506 5.506 5.658 5.658
County LSR employees per 1000 pop. 9.630 9.630 9.684 9.684
N 221,474 111,383 197,206 97,283
Means calculated using entropy balanced weights
Year and state coefficients are not displayed in the table
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Table 4: Dependent variables means using sampling weights
Women Men
No law Law No law Law
Health status 2.570 2.674 2.425 2.466
Exercise 0.721 0.719 0.788 0.788
Limited activity 0.242 0.235 0.190 0.188
Days of illness 10.482 10.690 9.788 9.912
Poor Health 10.622 10.445 10.590 10.387
Means calculated using sampling weights
Table 5: Dependent variables balanced means using balanced weights
Women Men
No law Law No law Law
Health status 2.676 2.674 2.491 2.466
Exercise 0.694 0.719 0.771 0.788
Limited activity 0.250 0.235 0.196 0.188
Days of illness 11.191 10.690 10.310 9.912
Poor Health 11.410 10.445 11.224 10.387
Means calculated using entropy balanced weights
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Table 6: Regressions on variables Health status and Exercise
1Health Status 2Exercise
Women Men Women Men
County has law enforced 0.026 0.015 -0.014 0.018
(0.023) (0.025) (0.030) (0.038)
County has law 0.126*** -0.004 -0.022 -0.038
(0.031) (0.023) (0.049) (0.045)
Age / 10 0.140*** 0.207*** -0.079*** -0.091***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Age (/10) squared -0.058*** -0.026*** 0.027*** 0.052***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Black race 0.173*** 0.077 -0.094* -0.132**
(0.027) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055)
Other minority 0.314*** 0.147*** -0.285*** -0.246***
(0.060) (0.053) (0.071) (0.064)
Hispanic ethnicity 0.384*** 0.282*** -0.390*** -0.468***
(0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.039)
Married -0.110*** -0.053*** 0.083*** -0.003
(0.015) (0.014) (0.027) (0.024)
Less than High School 1.088*** 1.047*** -0.793*** -0.929***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.046)
High school graduate 0.428*** 0.533*** -0.562*** -0.669***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.033)
SomeCollege 0.263*** 0.372*** -0.265*** -0.394***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.030)
Income < 15, 000 1.540*** 1.629*** -0.718*** -1.060***
(0.029) (0.038) (0.047) (0.039)
Income 15, 000− 25, 000 1.073*** 1.159*** -0.640*** -0.895***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028)
Income 25, 000− 35, 000 0.756*** 0.765*** -0.459*** -0.699***
(0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032)
Income 35, 000− 50, 000 0.508*** 0.531*** -0.330*** -0.574***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030)
Income 50, 000− 75, 000 0.286*** 0.302*** -0.181*** -0.382***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.029)
Income unknown 0.791*** 0.562*** -0.505*** -0.700***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.046) (0.036)
Pregnant -0.377*** -0.408***
(0.057) (0.084)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1 Ordered logit model; 2 Logit model
Population, year, and state coefficients are not displayed in the table.
26
Table 7: Regressions on variables Limited activity, Poor health, and Days of illness
1Limited Activity 2Poor Health 2Days of Illness
Women Men Women Men Women Men
County has law enforced -0.083** -0.013 -0.047** 0.011 -0.012 -0.001
(0.041) (0.034) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
County has law -0.129* -0.091 -0.046 -0.071*** -0.030 -0.066**
(0.074) (0.068) (0.041) (0.024) (0.027) (0.031)
Age / 10 0.249*** 0.311*** 0.095*** 0.122*** 0.098*** 0.139***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Age (/10) squared -0.085*** -0.069*** -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.037***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Black race -0.415*** -0.235*** -0.007 0.002 -0.031 -0.033
(0.033) (0.078) (0.033) (0.049) (0.026) (0.044)
Other minority 0.063 -0.069 0.153*** 0.155*** 0.067** 0.101**
(0.061) (0.067) (0.042) (0.041) (0.030) (0.040)
Hispanic ethnicity -0.569*** -0.462*** -0.082* -0.020 -0.009 -0.003
(0.050) (0.073) (0.042) (0.044) (0.029) (0.029)
Married -0.295*** -0.274*** -0.024 -0.022 -0.037*** -0.057***
(0.032) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015)
Less than High School -0.120** -0.062 0.298*** 0.355*** 0.278*** 0.290***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.028) (0.035) (0.024) (0.030)
High school graduate -0.045 0.138*** 0.255*** 0.332*** 0.198*** 0.277***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019)
SomeCollege 0.193*** 0.348*** 0.227*** 0.292*** 0.202*** 0.231***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.020)
Income < 15, 000 1.163*** 1.475*** 0.577*** 0.648*** 0.553*** 0.617***
(0.082) (0.049) (0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
Income 15, 000− 25, 000 0.693*** 0.883*** 0.422*** 0.470*** 0.409*** 0.439***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023)
Income 25, 000− 35, 000 0.330*** 0.464*** 0.311*** 0.304*** 0.292*** 0.264***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.025) (0.033) (0.022) (0.030)
Income 35, 000− 50, 000 0.218*** 0.341*** 0.137*** 0.276*** 0.168*** 0.213***
(0.041) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.025)
Income 50, 000− 75, 000 0.166*** 0.218*** 0.101*** 0.158*** 0.092*** 0.145***
(0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.022) (0.031)
Income unknown 0.466*** 0.494*** 0.456*** 0.461*** 0.396*** 0.389***
(0.048) (0.036) (0.027) (0.038) (0.026) (0.033)
Pregnant 0.126 0.069 0.100*
(0.100) (0.080) (0.057)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1 Logit model; 2 Poisson model
Population, year, and state coefficients are not displayed in the table.
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Figure 2: Western US geography of calorie-labeling laws
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